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Cloud computing technologies have the potential to increase innovation and economic
growth considerably. But many users worry that data in the cloud can be accessed by others,
thereby damaging the data owner. Consequently, they do not use cloud technologies up to
the efficient level. I design an institution that attenuates this problem. The scheme is built
around a private, nonprofit organization called cloud association, which is governed by rep-
resentatives of both cloud service providers and users, and which sources the actual auditing
and certification tasks out to independent certifiers. I show how this institution incentivizes
providers to produce high data security, and users to trust them and pay a premium for their
services. The cloud association simultaneously solves providers’ adverse selection problem
and certifiers’ moral hazard problem. By credibly implementing certified/not certified deci-
sions, it drastically reduces the technological complexity faced by users, which boosts trust
in cloud services.
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1 Introduction
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on demand network access to a shared pool
of configurable computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, applications, and services)
that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider
interaction (US National Institute of Standards and Technologies). Typical cloud services are
delivery of software, infrastructure, and storage over the Internet, based on user demand. The
use of cloud computing technologies decreases the fixed costs and transaction costs of using
computer power. It makes the supply of information technology (IT) resources more flexible for
users and consequently reduces the risks of fixed, long-term investments in IT infrastructure.
In short, cloud computing technologies have a huge upside potential increasing the efficiency
of many IT applications and, thereby, innovation and economic growth (Etro, 2009). In 2014,
global business spending for infrastructure and services related to the cloud is expected to reach
an estimated $174.2 billion, a 20 percent increase on 2013.1
However, there are important impediments to the wide adoption of cloud computing. Many
users—both individual consumers managing their personal files and businesses using IT services
as input into their own production—worry that data outsourced to the cloud can be accessed by
others, notably public authorities with legitimate or illegitimate objectives as well as legal and
illegal private actors.2 Such concerns regarding privacy, security, and data protection are a key
obstacle that hinder the cloud industry to realize its full economic and technological potential
(Cattedu and Hogben, 2009).3
In computer science, privacy and data security concerns are related to the concept of ac-
countability, which refers to a situation, where both a cloud service provider and a user “should
be able to check whether the cloud is running the service as agreed. If a problem appears, they
should be able to determine which of them is responsible, and to prove the presence of the
problem to a third party, such as an arbitrator or a judge” (Haeberlen, 2010); see also Pearson
(2011). A high level of accountability refers to a high level of data security, which is not only
implemented by a cloud service provider but also trusted by users. When a seller offers her
services to users—at a certain announced data-security level—the seller has potentially already
implemented a diverging true data security level. Therefore, the underlying economic problem
is adverse selection, which stems from asymmetric information between the seller and the buyer
about the true quality of the offered cloud service and which puts the entire market at the risk
1http://news.investors.com/technology-click/021414-690137-amzn-goog-msft-battling-for-growing
-cloud-market.htm.
2The recent hacking of iCloud pictures of celebrities has sparked such fears (http://www.computerworld.com/
article/2601905/apple-icloud-take-reputation-hits-after-photo-scandal.html).
3In Europe, sales of cloud computing services trail those in the U.S. by at least two years, owing to concerns
about privacy and fears that business secrets could be stolen in U.S. based cloud centers (New York Times, 2012).
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of breakdown (Akerlof, 1970).4
One standard way to solve adverse selection problems is signaling (Spence, 1973): if a cloud
service provider with high implemented accountability could credibly signal its quality to users,
and if it was prohibitively costly for low accountability providers to mimic this signal, users
could separate the wheat from the chaff and avoid the breakdown of the market for expensive
high-accountability cloud services. Such a signal could be offered by handing out warranties,
for instance, such that a user suffering from a data breach would have a legal right to ask
the cloud service provider to reimburse her for damages originating from the data breach. If
this strategy was implementable, only high-accountability providers would offer a warranty, a
strategy that would be too costly for low-accountability providers, who would expect facing
many warranty claims. Then, users could rationally trust the announcements of providers to
offer high-accountability services, simply because cheating would not give the provider any
advantage. The warranty would serve as an insurance policy.
Unfortunately, in cloud computing, it would be prohibitively costly for a service provider
to offer a warranty that covers 100 percent of all data security breaches, as, according to
industry representatives, complete data security does not exist in the cloud.5 Hence, handing
out warranties would involve high expected payments for providers, which would drive up prices
or even render all business models, including those involving high accountability, infeasible.
Instead, as I will show below, the optimal accountability level—which is actually paid by users in
equilibrium and leaves providers nonnegative profit—will typically cover less than 100 percent of
all risk and leave some residual risk to data security with the user. If a cloud provider’s warranty
would only cover certain risks, however, in case of a privacy infringement it would be impossible
for most users to identify whether the infringement would be covered by the warranty, or not,
due to lack of technical knowledge. Moreover, even a technology-savvy user would suffer from
the difficulty that it would be very expensive to prove in front of a public court that a certain
data security breach or privacy infringement was due to too low accountability of the provider.
One alternative mechanism that may solve the information asymmetry problem in the cloud
is private certification of accountability. Certification agencies have a long history of supporting
markets suffering from adverse selection, both in IT-related services and beyond (Rao, 1994,
Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch, 2005). If successful, a certification agency would only
award a certificate as “accountable cloud service provider” to providers who actually imple-
mented high accountability levels, such that the certification status of a seller could be used as
a proxy by users to make cloud service purchasing decisions. However, it has been documented
4Even in bilateral relationships between firms outsourcing their information security management to managed
security service providers, detecting security incidents and the efforts of providers to prevent them is difficult
(Cezar, Cavusoglu, and Raghunathan, 2014). In the cloud, such issues are multiplied.
5Both the industry partners and other computer scientists involved in the EU A4Cloud project confirmed this
view (http://www.a4cloud.eu/consortium).
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by empirical research that certified sellers are sometimes even less trustworthy than uncerti-
fied sellers (Edelman, 2011). Theoretical research has shown that certification agencies can be
motivated by profit-maximization motives to only award certificates truthfully (Strausz, 2005).
Such truthful behavior depends on the quick and reliable distribution of information about a
provider’s true accountability level—and thereby about a certifier’s true efforts in identifying
that accountability level and its truthful certification decisions—to all other users. Only then
could users identify “captured” certification agencies, not trust their certificates anymore, and
“punish” transgressors by not buying their services in the future. Given that the cloud com-
puting industry is characterized by users with heterogenous demands for cloud services and
heterogenous technological competence, and that the sheer amount of sellers and buyers on
this global market makes it unlikely that the relevant information spreads to a sufficient share
of users quickly, the moral hazard problem of a certifier, to award certificates truthfully, is
overwhelming.
These considerations lead to the following research questions. How can we incentivize cloud
service providers, who claim to have produced high accountability (or data security) levels, to
keep their contractual obligations and to install procedures that protect the accountability needs
of users? How can we make sure that users trust the promise of providers to implement certain
levels of accountability? How can we reduce the information costs for users, many of whom lack
the relevant knowledge or means to evaluate the accountability level of a given provider, such
that they can make informed consumption decisions? If the adverse selection problem between
cloud service providers and users could be solved by introducing some type of certification
scheme, how could the resulting moral hazard problem of the certifier, to save on the effort cost
to understand a provider’s true accountability level or to be bribed by the provider, be solved?
In an attempt to answer these questions, I design an institution that attenuates the spe-
cific problems of the cloud computing industry stated above: a coherent set of behavioral and
enforcement rules for the transactors involved such that nobody has an incentive to change
her behavior and such that this behavior involves using highly accountable cloud computing
services.6
In order to get there, in Section 2, I first discuss the relevant literature and identify the
type and key characteristics of the optimal institution. In Section 3, I construct and analyze
a game-theoretic model of the market interaction between cloud service providers and users
(and third parties supporting their transaction). That model allows to study the incentives of
each party involved, taking the incentives of the other parties into account, and to characterize
6Although this mechanism has some general properties and can inspire other applications (see the conclusion),
it is important that it is tailored towards the specific circumstances of the cloud computing industry. Otherwise,
trust can be lost too easily. See Montiel, Husted, and Christmann (2012) for a good example how sensitive to
the environment trust in private certification standards is.
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the optimal and the equilibrium levels of accountability. The theoretical results are instructive
both for managers of firms selling or buying cloud services and for policy makers concerned
with Internet governance. Section 4 contains extensions and robustness checks, whereas section
5 discusses managerial and policy implications and concludes. The model analysis is relegated
to the appendix.
2 Institutional choice: Reputation, litigation, or certification?
Under which conditions can users trust providers’ announced accountability levels—and, thereby,
privacy and data security promises? In search of the optimal institution that may solve this
problem,7 a few key factors can be identified. First, due to the international character of the
cloud computing industry, any single national or regional legislation or regulation is incapable
to set and enforce behavioral rules because providers could just move their cloud resources to
countries with less restrictions (possibly even without users noticing).8
Second, as exemplified by a 20 percent revenue growth rate in 2014 (cf. footnote 1), the cloud
computing industry is highly innovative and dynamic. Consequently, technological possibilities
constantly change, which requires continuous adaption of products, services, and business mod-
els. The administrative processes in bureaucratic, public administrations, and legislative and
regulatory agencies, which often require many decision-makers to get informed and vote about
topics at stake or to seek approval of new initiatives by elected government representatives, are
not well suited to create and constantly adjust appropriate rules that reflect the technical state
of the cloud computing industry.
Moreover, in many countries, data and privacy protection is a task of the same governmental
departments that are in charge of public safety, namely ministries of the interior. This creates
a moral hazard problem for these governmental departments because public safety is more
effective with access to more (personal) data of citizens, whereas the goal of data protection
is precisely to limit the flow of such data. Bundling both tasks within the same governmental
department is therefore likely to produce “compromises” between these goals, which diminishes
the to-be-expected protection of data that both individual end users and business users expose
to the cloud.9
As a consequence of these concerns, I conclude that the optimal institution to govern the
cloud is not characterized by public ordering but by private ordering, also referred to as self-
7Masten and Prüfer (2011) offer a classification of available governance institutions.
8Current struggles about the future governance of web-based industries among the multitude of stakeholders
surrounding ICANN and the Internet Governance Forum provide evidence for the difficulty to find one single
institution governing global industries (EU Commission, 2014). By contrast, the solution suggested here can
start at small scale and flexibly grow over time.
9Prüfer (2013) presents these arguments in more detail.
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governance, which is subject to more flexible rules and decision-making procedures.10
Amongst private ordering institutions, reputation mechanisms such as online feedback sys-
tems on exchange platforms, which offer transactors to leave feedback about their trade partner
and hence create a reputation for honesty or high quality, have been successfully used in on-
line environments (Dellarocas, 2003, Aperjis and Johari, 2010). But pure information feedback
mechanisms may be unreliable and suffer from omitted or biased feedback (Dellarocas andWood,
2008, Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010). Moreover, as long as the incentives and legal obligations of
the party managing the exchange platform are unclear to users, users may not trust that they
obtain complete and accurate information about the trading history of a given seller.11
Theoretical research has shown that both decentralized institutions, such as social networks,
and centralized institutions without an effective enforcement mechanism, such as trading plat-
forms, only work well as long as the importance of traders is rather symmetric, and if the total
number of traders is limited (Greif, Milgrom, and Weingast, 1994, Dixit, 2003). Empirically,
Ostrom (1990) confirms these results in several case studies, and Christmann and Taylor (2006)
find that ISO-certified firms in China set their level of compliance with the certification standard
strategically, depending on expected sanctions and customer monitoring.
If the alternative to a reputation mechanism is litigation, reputation performs badly if the
cost of litigation is low or the ability of courts to identify actual behavior of traders is high
(Bakos and Dellarocas, 2011, Masten and Prüfer, 2014). Both requirements are not met in
cloud computing, however, thereby diminishing the role of litigation in supporting contract
enforcement in the cloud, on top of the other problems of public ordering discussed above.
Bakos and Dellarocas (2011) show that litigation is more effective in preventing moral hazard
(that is, seller shirking) but that reputation is better in avoiding adverse selection (if there are
high quality and low quality sellers). Cai et al. (2013) obtain a related result by studying
trading data from a Chinese online platform. They confirm that more buyer protection can
worsen the adverse selection problem because it reduces the number of honest sellers, which,
in turn, decreases buyers’ trust that sellers do not act opportunistically. As an alternative,
law-based approach, O’Hara (2005) explores how contract law could be used to increase trust
of consumers in unknown online vendors. She concludes (p.1885): “Even if harmonization of
the online consumer protections could be achieved, however, it is not clear that consumer trust
in online vendors would be significantly enhanced.”
In this paper I show that, even in an industry where litigation is too costly and too inflexible,
and where meeting the courts’ standard of proof is very hard, pure reputation-based information
10See Williamson (2002) for a definition and discussion of the concepts of public and private ordering.
11On top, the policies of some governments to reserve the right to access data stored by firms registered in
their countries under certain circumstances, shatters the trust of users that access to data stored in the cloud is
limited to those parties defined by the data owner (Soghoian, 2010).
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distribution mechanisms, such as those used on many trading platforms on the Internet, can still
be less effective and less efficient than mechanisms that comprise active investigation of the facts
and punishment by a central (private) party. Therefore, the solution offered to the question
which type of institution optimally supports contract enforcement and prevents opportunistic
behavior by cloud service providers is given by certification agencies: private organizations
with an own legal entity that are staffed by industry experts, audit and monitor cloud service
providers, and award trust certificates only to those providers whose accountability standards
meet certain criteria.12
A first advantage of certification schemes is given by their reduction of information complex-
ity. In a market with relatively few technology-savvy users and with the possibility of providers’
accountability measures to differ in many dimensions, a certification scheme can pre-define min-
imum thresholds for each dimension—for instance, by specifying security standards for software,
hardware, and physical access to data centers. Consequently, a multidimensional performance
vector of cloud service providers is mapped onto a binomial, easily observable outcome variable:
is a provider certified, or not? Buehler and Schuett (2014) show by means of a game-theoretic
model that certification mechanisms outcompete minimum quality standards when the share
of uninformed consumers is large. This condition is given in cloud computing, where few users
are IT experts (at the level required to judge the security of cloud services) and most users are
unconnected to each other.
Apart from facilitating information flows about a provider’s accountability level, the critical
open issue is the certification agency’s own credibility problem (Gibbons and Henderson, 2012).
How to ensure that the certifier is not captured herself and that she does not have any incentive
to misreport the findings of her audit, for instance, because of bribes received from the certified
provider?13
This question—if not in the context of cloud computing—has already been studied in sev-
eral theoretical contributions (Strausz, 2005, Mathis et al., 2009, Peyrache and Quesada, 2011).
These authors show that reputation concerns of profit-maximizing certification agencies can
mitigate their incentives to shirk and avoid that they award certificates to providers with insuf-
ficient quality (or data security) standards. The main line of argumentation is that, if a certifier
would award a false certificate, consumers buying the falsely certified product would recognize
12Rao (1994) offers early empirical evidence that winning a certification contest enables firms to acquire a
reputation for competence. Bae et al. (2013) show that firms wishing to secure an S&P rating react strategically by
reporting more conservative financial statements. Corbett, Montes-Sancho, and Kirsch (2005) find in the context
of ISO 9000 certification that certified firms make significant abnormal profits after certification. Certification
even has measurable positive effects on the macro level: ISO 9000 certification levels are positively correlated
with a country’s export growth (Potoski and Prakash, 2009).
13Edelmann (2011) provides striking evidence that, without proper scrutiny in the auditing process, web sites
with “trust” labels are more likely to behave untrustworthy than uncertified sites.
6
its low quality and, hence, conclude that the certifier was “captured” (Strausz, 2005). By play-
ing a trigger strategy, that is, ceasing to buy from providers with certificates from captured
certifiers, consumers could destroy future profits of those certifiers, which mitigates certifiers’
incentives to get captured in the first place. Studying the business of credit rating agencies,
Mathis et al. (2009) conclude that reputation concerns can mitigate shirking if a sufficiently
large fraction of a rating agency’s income is generated by other sources than rating financial
products, for instance, by consulting. Peyrache and Quesada (2011) show that the probability
that a certifier colludes with her client depends on the certifier’s pricing strategy—a problem
that the institution described below takes care of by removing authority over pricing from the
certifier.
However, a decentralized economic governance scheme that rests only on the reputation
concerns of profit-maximizing certification agencies offering to audit providers based on idiosyn-
cratic standards is unlikely to be effective in the cloud computing industry.14 The main reason is
that such a scheme depends on the quick, cheap, and reliable transmission of information about
a given certifier’s behavior (and hence her reputation) among all industry participants. This
condition is hardly met in cloud computing, where heterogenous users from all over the world,
many of which do not have access to IT experts, cannot reliably judge whether a certificate is
credible, or not. Moreover, if certifiers are directly paid by providers—just as rating agencies
are paid by banks issuing financial products or certifiers of socially beneficial forest management
are paid by timber producers,15 and as is argued for by Stahl and Strausz (2011)—they cannot
be expected to value users’ interests more than necessary.
Strikingly, the theoretical literature modeling certification procedures has so far only con-
sidered one-layered certification schemes, where besides consumers and producers there is one
or a few competing certification agencies. When reviewing certification schemes that are used
in practice, however, it becomes prevalent that most schemes comprise two layers of certifiers.
For instance, the ISO 27001 Framework, which specifies the requirements for managing a docu-
mented information security management system, assumes one layer of certification bodies and
a second layer of national accreditation bodies, who certify the certifiers. The same holds for
audit frameworks set up by Online Trust Services, the German Federal Office for Information
Security (BSI), the UK Communications Electronics Security Group (CESG), the US Federal
Information Security Management Act (FISMA), and nearly all other frameworks studied by
ENISA (2013), which covers banking, payment cards, electricity generation, and health care
providers, on top of several existing IT auditing schemes.
Therefore, in this paper, I build on the insight by practitioners that a two-layered certifi-
cation scheme may be able to solve the problem of captured certifiers. This scheme is built
14Dixit (2009) offers a definition and overview of the concept of economic governance.
15See https://ic.fsc.org/index.htm.
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around a private nonprofit organization that I call cloud association, which is governed by both
representatives of providers and users and which sources the actual auditing and certification
tasks out to a pool of independent for-profit certifiers.16
I show how and under which conditions such an institution can induce an equilibrium where
cloud service providers produce high accountability levels and users trust them and buy their
services, for a premium. In this equilibrium, a provider chooses to produce a high accountability
level, which meets the certification requirements determined by the cloud association, because
it increases her profits. It increases her profits because users are willing to pay a premium for a
provider’s services who is certified by the association. The certificate is reliable because certifiers
have an incentive to invest effort in auditing and to honestly decide about the certification
status of providers. This incentive exists because users who suffer from low accountability of
a certified provider have an incentive to complain with the association. Following a complaint,
the cloud association would investigate the case and, if it finds a breach of contract, revoke the
provider’s certificate and ban the captured certifier from all future business. Cheated users would
actually complain because they are reimbursed for damage suffered from low accountability if
the association finds for them. In turn, the association would keep its promises because of the
checks and balances institutionalized in the governance structure of the association’s board.
In the terminology of Bakos and Dellarocas (2011), the main problem between users and
cloud service providers, once they implemented a certain accountability level, is adverse selec-
tion: providers with low accountability have an incentive to mimic those with high accountabil-
ity, which can lead to market breakdown due to asymmetric information. This problem is solved
by (private) litigation, in the sense that providers have to earn a certificate from a certification
agency in order to get access to users with high willingness-to-pay. The higher-level problem,
moral hazard of certification agencies who would like to save on the effort cost when auditing
providers, is solved by a combination of private litigation (by the cloud association board’s tri-
bunal) and reputation (by withdrawing profitable future business from transgressing certifiers).
Finally, the risk of capturing the cloud association’s board is prevented because representatives
of providers and users have to make decisions jointly. This governance structure implements
cooperative behavior between the two opposing market sides, which makes sure that nobody is
worse off than without it.
3 A Model of Cloud Governance
On the demand side of the market, consider a unit mass of risk-neutral users—who can be busi-
ness or individual consumers—each demanding one unit of cloud computing services. Without
16Business associations can perform many other tasks that are valuable for their members. See Prüfer (2014)
for details.
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consumption, a user gets zero value. User i obtains indirect consumption utility of:17
vi = u− (1− σ)si − p, (1)
where u > 0 denotes the gross utility from consuming a secure service, and σ ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
probability that no data security incident occurs. σ is a measure for the accountability level set
by the provider selling the cloud service, which is unobservable to users.18 si ∼ U(0, s̄) denotes
the disutility of user i in case of a security incident, which captures heterogeneous preferences
for accountability across users.19 Service providers know the distribution of si but do not know
the preferences of a specific user. Hence they cannot engage in perfect price discrimination.
Higher s̄ refers to a more security-sensitive set of users on average. p stands for the price that a
provider charges for one unit of her cloud services. We only consider cases where the following
assumption holds.20
Assumption 1 (User preferences) Some users have strong accountability preferences: s̄ >
u
2 .
On the supply side of the market, we focus on one monopolistic cloud service provider.21
The provider maximizes profits and solves:
maxσ,p π = pq(p, σ̃)− c(σ), (2)
where q denotes demand for the provider’s services, which negatively depends on price p and
positively on the accountability level expected by users, σ̃. To produce services of accountability
σ, the provider incurs a cost c(σ), which is increasing and convex in σ:
c(σ = 0) = c′(σ = 0) = 0, c′(σ > 0) > 0, c′′(σ) > 0. (3)
All other costs of the provider are irrelevant for this study and therefore normalized to zero.
Aiding the market transaction between users and providers, there are two types of interme-
diaries. First, there is a private, nonprofit organization called cloud association. The provider
17See section 4 for a discussion of the utility function.
18In practice, accountability is a multifaceted concept (Pearson et al., 2012). The service level agreement
between a provider and a user typically describes how the provider promises to protect the user’s data. I assume
that users can distinguish more promised protection from less promised protection of their data. They do not
observe the realized protection of their data, however.
19Both Chellappa and Sin (2005) and Solove (2007) provide evidence for the fact that users have very diverse
privacy preferences and that virtually everyone is concerned about privacy infringements to some degree. See
the literature cited therein for legal and philosophical discussions about the conception of privacy. Goldfarb and
Tucker (2012) provide evidence for the fact that users’ privacy concerns are increasing over time.
20Tsai et al. (2011) show in experimental research that users are willing to pay a premium to online retailers who
better protect their privacy. Pearson et al. (2012) discuss heterogenous consumer preferences for accountability
in the cloud.
21Section 4 discusses competition among several providers (and certifiers).
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can become a member of this association for a fee F , which, in exchange, allows her to demand
that her cloud services are audited and, if found to be of a certain accountability standard, that
she is certified as “accountable cloud service provider” by the cloud association. Specifically,
the certificate should be awarded if, and only if, the provider’s σ ≥ σ̂, where σ̂ is the publicly
known threshold accountability level determined by the cloud association.
The cloud association is governed by a board, which consists of representatives of both
providers and users. For simplicity, I assume that the representatives of providers have formal
authority over decision making but that users’ representatives can veto them.22 Hence, all
decisions issued by the association’s board must be acceptable to both users and providers, by
construction.
As the cloud association is a nonprofit organization, board members cannot legally take
out profits (if existing) and can therefore be expected to pursue the objectives for which they
were selected—advocating users’ (1) or providers’ (2) interests, respectively.23 These control
rights and internal checks and balances make the cloud association board the final, credible,
and legitimate authority of the cloud industry, “which depends on acceptance by the cloud
computing community” (Reed, 2013:5).24
The association’s board, however, is limited in size and capacity and, therefore, cannot
audit and certify providers itself. Therefore, the auditing procedure is outsourced to a profit-
maximizing certification agency (or auditor).25 An auditor can decide whether to thoroughly
scrutinize the accountability level of a provider (a = 1) or only to pretend that she is truly
auditing (a = 0). a is unobservable to everybody else, besides the auditor and the audited
service provider, and comes at cost acA to the auditor, where cA > 0. If the auditor chooses
a = 1, she perfectly learns the provider’s accountability level, σ. If a = 0, the auditor does not
learn anything.26 In a second decision, which is costless, the auditor decides whether to award
the provider with a certificate, or not.
To avoid that auditors are captured or bribed by the service provider they are to audit
(Strausz, 2005), auditors have to seek a license from the cloud association. In practice, seeking
22If both groups had active decision making power, I would have to make an assumption about the distribution
of bargaining power. The quality of the results is not affected by the assumption used but the solution is more
tractable.
23Filistrucchi and Prüfer (2014) provide theory and evidence that nonprofit board members make decisions
in line with their personal, observable values, thereby supporting upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason,
1984).
24Users could be represented, for instance, by consumer protection agencies. Reed (2013) also points to the
fact that industry self regulation works imperfectly when only one side of the market, such as producers, is in
charge of governing the rules and their enforcement, as happened in the UK financial services sector.
25The certification process has to comprise unexpected and ongoing checks of the provider’s implemented
accountability level. See Probst et al. (2012) for more details regarding the technical requirements.
26Reality is more nuanced but this assumption captures the qualitative costs and benefits of effort in auditing.
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a license implies that the auditor is being educated by the cloud association how to conduct
an audit using the association’s auditing protocol. This comes at a cost cL, borne by the
association.27 If an auditor undergoes the licensing procedure, it is possible for the cloud
association to verify ex post whether the auditor actually complied with the auditing protocol
when auditing a provider.28
The association board determines the certification protocol (captured by σ̂). It also licenses
certifiers and determines the remuneration sum R that it pays a certification agency in exchange
for auditing a provider. To deter providers and certifiers from cheating about the true level of
σ, the cloud association applies several policies: First, it offers users who bought the service of a
certified cloud service provider the opportunity to complain about the provider’s accountability
level.29 If a user complains that σ < σ̂, the association automatically starts an investigation.
For the cost cV it verifies whether the auditing procedure applied by the certifier to the cloud
provider was in line with the protocol (that is, whether σ ≥ σ̂ and hence whether the certificate
was awarded correctly, or not). By assumption, fraud committed by licensed auditors can be
perfectly detected.30 If the cloud association finds that a certificate was granted despite σ < σ̂,
it revokes the certificate from the provider and the license from the fraudulent certifier and bans
the certifier from ever seeking a license again. In this case, the user who correctly complained
is reimbursed by getting the service of an alternative certified provider, paid for by the cloud
association, at accountability level σ̂. If the association finds, following a complaint by the
provider, that the certificate was not granted despite σ ≥ σ̂, it also revokes the certifier’s license
but directly awards the provider with a certificate.31 For tractability reasons, I assume that
complaining is costly but not very much so.32
Assumption 2 (Costs of complaining) Complaining about a provider’s accountability level
to the cloud association costs a user cC = ε, where ε → 0.
27Whether the cloud association pays cL (and increases the membership-fee F ) or the certification agency pays
cL (and gets increased per-audit revenue R, which increases the membership-fee F ) is equivalent within this
model framework.
28Using its auditing protocol also enables the association to verify ex post, that is, after an incident occurred,
whether the incident occurred because of low security measures (σ < σ̂) or because of the residual risk uncovered
by the Service Level Agreement between the provider and a user. In this model, the residual risk is 1− σ.
29Because complaining is endogenous to every user, this mechanism picks up the idea that voluntary feedback
from traders in reputation systems is important in creating trust in markets (Li and Xiao, 2014).
30In the model, making the certification decision verifiable is the reason for spending the licensing cost cL. In
practice, having a standardized auditing protocol (including the results and log files of the auditor’s tests) makes
it much easier for an auditor of auditors to identify irregularities and hence fraud.
31It is possible that a user suffers from a security incident despite the fact that the certified provider set σ ≥ σ̂.
In this case, the ex post verification of the cloud association would show that there was no fraud. Hence, neither
the provider nor the certification agency would be punished. The user would suffer from the materialized residual
risk inherent in imperfect security technologies. See also Footnote 28.
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Figure 1: Governing the Cloud with the Cloud Association
An additional cheating prevention is the specification that there are no direct payment flows
from the provider to her auditor (payments are channeled through the association) and that
the cloud association sustains an entire pool of certification agencies, from which it randomly
picks one certifier to audit the provider.33
The proposed governance structure of the cloud computing industry is depicted in Figure
1. Payment flows are indicated by straight arrows, whereas all other services offered from one
party to another one are indicated by dashed arrows (with their respective costs in parentheses).
The transactors play an infinitely repeated game with common discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1).
The timing of the game in each period t is as follows:
1. The cloud association determines the membership-fee F and the accountability threshold
level σ̂, which it announces in public, and licenses a certifier (creating cost cL).
2. The cloud service provider sets accountability level σ (for cost c(σ)) and price p, and
decides whether to join the association and demand being audited (for membership-fee
F ).
3. If an audit is demanded, the association commissions a licensed certifier to audit the
provider, offering revenue R.
4. The commissioned certifier chooses auditing effort a (for cost acA) and awards a certificate,
or not. If the audited provider feels cheated by the certifier, she can complain with the
cloud association.
33This serves to minimize the opportunity for a specific certifier and the provider to engage in a repeated game,
where payments in one period could be reciprocated by a positive certification decision in the future.
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5. Users learn the provider’s price and certification status and individually decide whether
to buy the provider’s service.
6. Every buyer can file a complaint with the association that a certified provider produced
σ < σ̂. All complaints are investigated by the cloud association (for cost cV ).
As every infinitely repeated game, this game has multiple equilibria. In Appendix A, I
solve it for a subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure strategies that produces σ > 0 and prove the
following Proposition.34
Proposition 1 (Subgame-perfect equilibrium) If all cost parameters (cC , cA, cL, cV , c(σ))
are not too high and utility u is not too low, then a subgame-perfect equilibrium exists and is
characterized as follows:







4(1−σ̂1)s̄ − c(σ̂1) > u− (1− σ̂2)s̄− c(σ̂2),
σ̂2 otherwise
(4)




|σ < 1− u2s̄} and σ̂2 ≡ {σ|c′(σ) = s̄ ∧ σ ≥ 1− u2s̄}.






2 if σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
u− (1− σ̂)s̄ if σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ .
(5)
3. The association commissions a certifier and offers revenue R∗ = cA/δ.
4. The certifier sets a∗ = 1 and awards a certificate truthfully. The provider does not com-
plain.
5. Users with accountability preferences si ≤ s1∗ buy from the certified provider; users with
preferences si > s1
∗ do not buy. s1∗ = u2(1−σ̂∗) if c
′(σ̂∗) < s̄, and s1∗ = s̄ if c′(σ̂∗) ≥ s̄.
6. Because there is no fraud, nobody complains. But in case of fraud, a cheated user would
complain about the provider to the cloud association.
Proposition 1 is a summary of Lemmas A.1 through A.5 (all in the appendix). It provides
us with several results. First, the cloud association sets the membership fee for a provider, F ∗,
to the smallest possible level that can finance the system—simply because there is no use of
34Equilibrium decisions are marked by asterisks.
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piling up money within a nonprofit organization if the association members can just keep and
spend the money individually as they like. Second, that “smallest level” just makes sure that
the association has the means to pay for the licensing and, if necessary, also for the ex post
verification of the certifier who is to audit the member. Additionally, the membership-fee has
to cover the association’s expenses for paying the certifier an efficiency wage, which incentivizes
her to invest effort in auditing and make a truthful certification decision.35 This efficiency
wage, R∗, grows in the cost the auditor incurs when exerting effort (cA) and if the auditor is
less patient (if δ decreases). Thereby, the auditor makes positive profits in equilibrium—that is,
she earns an information rent—but behaves as aspired by the association because she is afraid
of losing those profits in the future when her fraudulent behavior would be detected.
A second set of results concerns the market interaction following the association’s determi-
nation of the threshold accountability level, σ̂, the corresponding incentives of the provider to
seek certification, the provider’s pricing decision, and the users’ consumption decisions. The
first insight here is that, although σ has support over the interval [0, 1], as soon as σ̂ is set by
the association, the provider only has two rational choices: either to set σ = σ̂ (but not higher)
and seek certification, or to set σ = 0, forego certification, and save on the cost of producing
data security.
This insight is used by the association when determining σ̂∗. The association board makes
a guess how a given level of σ̂ would impact the incentives of the provider (i) to offer cloud
services in the market altogether and (ii) to prefer seeking certification over non-certification.
Importantly, although ceteris paribus users prefer a higher over a lower accountability level,
because of the convex shape of the cost function to produce accountability, c(σ), it is possible
that producing highest accountability levels is so expensive for the provider that users would not
be willing to pay the corresponding high price necessary to cover the provider’s cost. Therefore,
if either c(σ) or any one part determining the membership fee ( cAδ , cL, and cV ) is too high as
compared to the gross utility from consuming a secure cloud service (u), the mechanism breaks
down and it is impossible to establish σ > 0 in a certification equilibrium.36 Therefore, for the
rest of this analysis, consider the case where those costs are not prohibitive.
A key characteristic of the cloud computing market is that increasing the credible account-
ability level of certified providers, σ̂, drives up demand so much that the market is covered for
all levels above some threshold (namely for σ̂ ≥ 1 − u2s̄). Equation (5) displays the provider’s
profit-maximizing pricing strategy, which depends on this threshold. As long as demand is still
elastic, the price is independent of σ̂: If the association increases σ̂ by one marginal unit, this
35See Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) for intuition and background on the efficiency wage hypothesis.
36In this case, the model predicts that the cloud computing market is served by providers with very low
accountability levels (σ = 0) meeting a positive, yet small amount of users paying a modest price—p∗(x = 0) =
u
2
⇒ s0 = u2 > 0; see equations (A.9) and (A.5).
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drives up demand for cloud services and thereby increases the provider’s revenues. By contrast,
if σ̂ reached the threshold level and all users buy cloud services, the provider’s best response to
an additional increase in σ̂ is to increase the price p∗, too.
This bifid equilibrium pricing strategy induces that the provider’s profit function has two
local peaks: one in the range where demand is still elastic (characterized by a σ̂-level where the
marginal cost of accountability, c′(σ̂) < s̄) and one in the range where the market is covered
(characterized by a σ̂-level where c′(σ̂) = s̄). Which of these two local maxima is the global
profit-maximizing σ̂-level depends on the shape of c(σ) and on s̄.37
Finally, a crucial condition to establish the certification equilibrium characterized above is
the requirement that the cost, cC , of a user to complain to the cloud association in case she
received cloud services with less accountability than certified is rather low. In this baseline
model, Assumption 2 does the trick for us, assuming cC → 0. In Section 4, I discuss the conse-
quences of significant positive costs of complaining. Independent of the level of cC , however, the
dependence of the certification equilibrium on cC underlines one interesting feature of economic
governance mechanisms. In order to obtain aspired behavior of agents, it is necessary to have
credible punishment mechanisms in place, which are triggered only by unaspired behavior (here:
certifiers and certified providers are punished only, by withdrawing business from them in the
future, if they claim to produce accountability σ̂ but then fail to do so). As soon as such trigger
punishment is credible, however, it is not in the interest of agents to pull the trigger. Punishment
is credible if it is in the interest of and affordable to the punisher. As a consequence, the actual
punishment costs are saved. In this model, the costs that are saved on the equilibrium path are
the cost of complaining (cC) and the cost of ex post verification of the auditing procedure (cV ).
The cost that are actually incurred by using the certification governance scheme are the cost of
licensing certifiers (cL) and the cost of auditing providers (cA).
Further insights are generated by studying the equilibrium payoffs of provider and users, as
detailed in Lemma A.5. As a group, users have a uniquely preferred accountability level. This
level—in the model at σ̂ = 1 − u2s̄—just leads to full market coverage: Already accounting for
the provider’s pricing strategy, it is sufficient to convince the user with highest accountability
preferences, at si = s̄, to buy from the provider and obtain net indirect utility of zero. All other
users receive positive consumer surplus (owing to the assumption that price discrimination
according to individual accountability preferences is impossible).38 The fact that users are
37At the end of Appendix A, I provide a numerical example that shows how the model can be used to identify
the σ̂∗-level producing the global profit-maximum.
38If the association would increase σ̂ even further, the net payoffs of users would decrease. This holds because
the provider would increase the price in line with σ̂, always making sure that the user at si = s̄ is just indifferent
between buying and not buying. Because all other users have a lower willingness-to-pay for marginal account-
ability, they would be charged the same marginal price increase targeted at the user at si = s̄ but would receive
lower marginal consumption utility because their si < s̄. This process comes to an end, at the latest, where
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represented on the cloud association board and equipped with the right to veto the strategy
proposals of providers leads to the outcome that all users (but the indifferent one at si = s̄)
receive higher net utility if a credible certification scheme is in place than if it is not.
At equilibrium, users’ payoffs only depend on their accountability preferences, proxied by s̄,
and on the threshold accountability level of certified providers, σ̂∗, which depends on the cost
of producing accountability. It is noteworthy that all costs of the certification process are borne
by the provider.39 This characteristic survives when there are two competing providers (see
section 4.3). Consequently, it will be providers who stop using the certification scheme first if
the usage costs grow too large.
4 Extensions and Robustness
4.1 The value of personalization technologies
Both Culnan and Armstrong (1999) and Chellappa and Sin (2005) find in survey data that
consumers are willing to provide more information about themselves—and reap higher benefits
from personalization—if they trust a vendor more to apply fair privacy protection procedures.
By assuming u to be a constant in equation (1), I abstract from such gross utility gains through
accepting lower privacy standards, for two reasons. First, independent of the amount of secret
business data or personal data that becomes known to a cloud service provider via personal-
ization technologies, the user will only be damaged if this data leaks to third parties—which
is captured by the probability (1− σ) here. Second, I assume that the net utility of users (vi)
is decreasing in the extent of privacy infringements. If that were not true at least for some
users, there would be no market for data protection, which is in contradiction to the evidence
presented by Chellappa and Sin (2005), Solove (2007), Tsai et al. (2011), Goldfarb and Tucker
(2012), and Pearson et al. (2012).
4.2 Certifying the cloud value chain
A key characteristic of the cloud computing industry, which contributes to the flexible supply
of service providers and thereby to the potential efficiency gains of the entire industry, is that
cloud service providers frequently subcontract parts of the service they offer customers to other
service providers, who, in turn, may subcontract parts of the work even further, and so on
(Haeberlen, 2010). Thereby, the provider modeled in section 3 above turns into a value chain
of providers, which are legally connected by contracts. In this case, the spirit of the model
would dictate that the original provider (coined data controller), who concludes a service level
agreement with the user (coined data owner, in case of individual users potentially also data
σ̂ = 1− u2
4s̄2
is reached because there users are better off without certification.
39This directly refers to cA
δ
+ cL + cV but can also include cC ; see Section 4.
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subject), would be responsible for the accountability level of all upstream providers (coined data
processors).40 The data controller could fulfil this obligation by subcontracting only to other
providers that are also certified by the cloud association and take responsibility that the data
owner’s data never leaves the network of certified service providers.
Formally, if such a value chain consists of K service providers and σk is the accountability
level of provider k ∈ {1, ...,K}, at equilibrium we must have argmin{σk ∈ {σ1, ..., σK}} = σ̂∗;
see equation (4). The weakest link of the chain must be sufficiently strong to sustain credibility
in the entire chain.
4.3 The case of competition
Consider first the case of duopoly competition. If two cloud service providers play the game
described above simultaneously, it can be shown that at equilibrium one provider will join the
cloud association, pay the fee F , seek certification, produce high accountability σ = σ̂, and
command a high price in the market. The other provider will not join the association, produce
no accountability (σ = 0) and charge a low but strictly positive price.41 Consequently, just as
in Proposition 1, users with high accountability preferences si > s1
∗ do not buy. In the duopoly,
however, cloud services are vertically differentiated and, hence, the market is split: users with
intermediate preferences, si ∈ (s0∗, s1∗], buy from the certified provider, whereas users with low
valuation for accountability, si ≤ s0∗, buy from the uncertified provider; where s0∗ < s1∗.42
These results create the prediction that competition among cloud service providers, when
credible certification is available, will lead to provider stratification. Users who do not value
privacy a lot can get cheap cloud services but face a large risk that third parties access their
data. Users with higher security demand can be relatively sure that their data is secure but
have to pay a premium for such security.43 One important requirement to obtain a certified
provider in such a duopoly model is that the threshold accountability level to become certified,
σ̂∗, is not too low. Otherwise, the additional security that a certified provider can credibly
supply over the uncertified outside option (σ̂∗ − 0) is too low to command a price that covers
the costs of producing σ̂∗ and paying the certification process.
If the number of competing cloud service providers is increased above two, there are still no
more than two equilibrium accountability levels, σ̂∗ and 0. Standard economic theory would
predict that entry occurs as long as the equilibrium profits of all providers are zero. In the
model set-up of this paper, given that there are no costs for uncertified providers, many firms
40Pearson (2011) and Pearson et al. (2012) explain the terminology used in more detail.
41Proofs for these results are available from the author upon request.
42See Shaked and Sutton (1982) and the subsequent literature for more findings on vertically differentiated
products.
43Users can never trust privacy in the cloud absolutely as long the residual risk of a security incident (1−σ̂∗) > 0.
See section 4.1 and footnotes 28 and 31 related to this point.
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could offer uncertified services and de facto find themselves in a market with Bertrand price
competition with homogenous goods, driving the price for uncertified services (and σ = 0) to
marginal cost, i.e. zero. This result does not extend to the market segment of certified cloud
services. If more than one provider gets certification, total demand for that segment (s1
∗− s0∗)
is split among those providers, which reduces revenues of any individual provider. Such entry
could be incentive-compatible for a limited number of certified providers at equilibrium, given
the right parameter values. But as soon as demand is split too much due to entry of further
certified providers, the certification equilibrium would break down because the fixed costs of
getting certification could not be borne by associated revenues, anymore.
One way to delay market breakdown would be the introduction of several vertically stratified
certification thresholds, each handing out different certificates, for example, at the gold, silver,
and bronze levels (where σ̂gold > σ̂silver > σ̂bronze). Each level could sustain one (or a few)
providers, depending on parameter realizations, and cut the entire market in several niches.
The problem that such differentiation would create is, however, that it requires users to know
about and understand all available niches, such that they can make informed consumption
decisions. This requirement stands in contrast to one of the motivations of this paper, that
many users have a limited understanding of the technical subtleties of cloud services, which
renders the mechanism with one unique certification threshold studied in the baseline model
very attractive.
4.4 Multiple certifiers and multiple providers
The baseline model studies one provider and one certifier. If there were N licensed certifiers
who would be randomly matched with M providers demanding certification every period, the
probability of each licensed certifier to get a job in a certain future period would turn to M/N .
Consequently, the net present value from investing auditing effort a = 1 and honestly awarding
certificates would turn to 11−δ
M
N (R−cA). The threshold revenue to make this strategy incentive
compatible for all N licensed certifiers become R ≥ (1−δ)N+δMδM cA, which is larger than the
threshold revenue depicted in equation (A.7) of the baseline model if, and only if, N > M .
Apart from this quantitative adjustment, the quality of the remaining results is robust up to
the limits discussed in section 4.3.
4.5 Positive costs of complaining
Consider the case where Assumption 2 does not hold, that is, where a user who complains
about low accountability of a provider, bears a substantial cost cC > 0. In this case, Lemma
A.1.(ii) states that only security-sensitive users (with si ≥ cCσ̂ ) would complain in equilibrium.




complain. If cC was sufficiently large, one might guess that this would invite some providers
to gamble and produce low accountability and their certifiers to risk handing out certificates
without investing any auditing effort. The incentive compatibility constraint of a certifier to
invest a = 1 and award the certificate truthfully, equation (A.6), would become harder to fulfil
because in expectation the certifier would get payoff R in every future period with probability
cC
σ̂ despite having cheated. This effectively increases the necessary efficiency wage R
∗ above the
level given in equation (A.7).
If we allow for a slight adjustment of the mechanism, this ad hoc intuition is misleading,
though. Alternatively to increasing the income of certifiers, R∗, the cloud association could just
determine that a user who correctly complains about the low accountability level of a provider
does not only get substitute services with accountability σ̂∗ but also a lump-sum payment cC . In
order to have funds to pay out such lump-sum payments, the association would have to slightly
increase the membership-fee F . Then all users would be incentivized to complain whenever they
find σ < σ̂∗. Because, on the equilibrium path, there is no fraud and, hence, no complaints,
this promise would even come for free after all (see the explanation at the end of section 3).
5 Discussion, Implications, and Further Research
The huge upside potential that cloud computing technologies offer both to producers and users,
teamed with significant impediments to realizing this potential because of users’ lack of trust in
the security of sensitive data they put to the cloud, got this study started. Such lack of trust is
a consequence of several interrelated problems stemming from asymmetric information between
sellers, buyers, and third parties supporting their transaction. Once a cloud service provider
implemented a high accountability level, she suffers from an adverse selection problem because
she has no means to credibly convince users that their data are secured. As soon as certification
agencies, who audit providers’ accountability levels and award“trust” certificates, are employed,
such adverse selection can be mitigated but an additional problem arises: certifiers’ moral hazard
to actually spend unverifiable effort on understanding the true accountability levels of providers.
Inspired by the structure of existing certification schemes, I develop and apply the idea
that representatives of both providers and users should jointly oversee the certification process
in an independent, private body, called cloud association. Due to capacity constraints at the
board level, this association sources the actual auditing process and certification decisions out to
independent certification agencies. But it requires these agencies to undergo a costly licensing
procedure ex ante, which enables it to verify ex post whether the auditor committed fraud. In
turn, opportunistic behavior by the cloud association, in its function as auditor of auditors,
is avoided because the governance structure of the association establishes checks and balances
between representatives of both sides of the market.
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My results show that in a dynamic, globally operating industry a private ordering institution,
in the sense of Williamson (2002), can avoid market breakdown (in theory) and thereby support
market growth (in practice). In Williamson’s (1991) terms, the problem of adaptation (to the
dynamic, global market) can best be solved by a hybrid governance structure that combines
hierarchical elements (within the association) and market elements (between the association and
certifiers) without relying on public enforcement. The effectiveness of this institution depends
on the careful composition of organizational and institutional features. For instance, in this
model the profit-motive of both cloud service providers and certification agencies motivates
them to act in the way aspired by the cloud association, whereas it is critical to take away
the profit-motive from decision-makers within the association by incorporating it as a nonprofit
organization and implementing checks and balances between the two camps of representatives
of both market sides, providers and users.
Because the cloud association keeps records about the reported history of all certifiers, it
serves as an institutionalized, central information repository of the cloud computing industry.
This characteristic enables the association to play a grim trigger (ostracism) strategy with
respect to certifiers: it can condition the award of a license to a certifier on her history and refuse
to license a certifier who has ever falsely awarded a certificate, thereby expelling the fraudulent
certifier from the community of licensed certifiers—and from all related future profits. This
threat is credible because cheated users are incentivized to report their damage to the cloud
association (via expecting indemnification for their losses from low accountability by receiving
a substitute, high-accountability service) and because the requirement of using the association’s
auditing protocol makes the actions of the certifier verifiable ex post. The “eternal memory”
characteristic of the cloud association is a key advantage over any mechanism that only involves
decentralized players, who suffer from imperfect transmission of information about a certifier’s
past actions.
As proposed in this paper, the idea of the cloud governance scheme surrounding the cloud
association is novel. But related schemes do exist in practice. For example, the Cloud Security
Alliance (CSA) describes itself as“a not-for-profit organization with a mission to promote the use
of best practices for providing security assurance within Cloud Computing, and to provide edu-
cation on the uses of Cloud Computing to help secure all other forms of computing. The Cloud
Security Alliance is led by a broad coalition of industry practitioners, corporations, associations
and other key stakeholders” (https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/about/). Membership for
corporate members, usually cloud service providers and corporate cloud customers, is available
for U$ 10,000 p.a. (as of November 2014) and gives the members voice within the CSA. A key
task of the CSA is to define provider certification schemes (called Open Certification Framework
(OCF)/STAR Registry) and auditor licensing schemes—analogous to setting σ̂ spending cL in
my model. Under the STAR Certification rules, only nationally licensed certification bodies
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can become STAR Certification Auditors—provided they become CSA Corporate Members,
obtain special training, and pass an exam (resembling the licensing procedure and cost cL in
my model). The CSA decides when to review the certification bodies, a process that is paid for
by the certifiers. The CSA is governed by a board, which hires an executive team of industry
experts as managers.
The key differences between the existing CSA scheme and the scheme proposed in this paper
are the following: First, the proposed scheme does not rely on governmental pre-licensing of
certifiers by their national governments (because of the problems of public ordering discussed in
the Section 2). Second, this scheme advocates a strong role of users, including decision-making
power (or at least veto power) on the cloud association board, whereas the current CSA scheme
is more open, allowing both corporate and individual members to raise their voices regarding
key decisions; this cannot avoid, however, that user interests can be overridden by provider
interests. Third, the CSA has still underdeveloped tools to receive and incorporate end user
feedback and complaints about specific providers, let alone to incentivize users to file complaints
if they think they were cheated.
Regarding the practical implications suggested by the model in this paper, it is critical to
bear the conditions in Proposition 1 in mind under which the certification equilibrium can exist:
the cost parameters (cC , cA, cL, cV , c(σ)) must not be too high and consumption utility u must
not be too low. This predicts that only cloud services that create sufficient value for users will
be accompanied by certification schemes. For low value applications, certification is too expen-
sive. More importantly, users’ cost of complaining, certifiers’ cost of auditing according to the
association’s protocol, the association’s cost of licensing and educating certifiers and verifying
an actual certification procedure ex post, as well as provider’s cost of producing accountability
must not be too high if the certification scheme suggested here is to work in practice. This
insight calls for the least complex certification procedure that can assure a certain accountabil-
ity level, and it calls for the development of software systems that reduce all these costs, for
instance to make complaining about a provider as simple and cheap as possible for users. The
model also strongly suggests that public decision makers do not get directly involved in the
procedures and enforcement of the cloud association’s rules.
Although this model is designed for the cloud computing industry, it can inform trust-based
governance schemes in other industries that are subject to asymmetric information problems
as well. Its main power stems from the reduction of complexity from consumers’ perspectives,
which is achieved by the transformation of a multidimensional quality vector into an easily
observable, binary certified/not certified-variable. This characteristic is shared by many high-
tech industries with both business-to-business and business-to-consumer transactions. A further
characteristic that facilitates the application of the cloud association governance structure to
other industries is a similar cost structure, especially constant and low marginal costs of pro-
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duction and distribution, such that capacity constraints are usually not binding and such that
sellers sell their products worldwide to heterogenous consumers. Nevertheless, it remains im-
portant to study the specific institutional background of the industry at stake in detail and
not to plainly transplant the governance structure proposed here for the cloud. For instance,
Montiel, Husted, and Christmann (2012) showed, based on ISO 14001 environmental manage-
ment system certification among automotive plants in Mexico, that widespread corruption in
the general environment can extend distrust to private certification systems, thereby reducing
the credibility of private certification schemes. In such an environment, certification schemes
may not be the optimal contract enforcement institution.
In this paper I have shown that and why a two-tiered certification framework designed around
the cloud association can improve the use of cloud computing technologies. However, it is subject
of future research both in management science and in information systems and computer science
to study its optimal implementation. For inspiration, Albuquerque, Bronnenberg, and Corbett
(2007) have compared diffusion patterns of ISO 9000 and ISO 14000 certification standards and
shown which impact factors critically facilitate adoption there. Their results may be relevant
for cloud computing, too. Insights from legal scholarship may be helpful in identifying the
necessary legal circumstances when establishing the cloud association framework, and further
research on the dynamics of organizational development are needed to better understand the
way from where we stand today to a fully implemented governance institution. The cloud
computing industry draws on many fields of expertise. As researchers, we may also need to




A Proof of Proposition 1
Preliminary remarks: The six-stage game in period t described in the main text is solved by
backward induction. In this appendix, I formally solve the model. Interpretation and economic
intuition of the intermediate results is provided in the main text. Before detailing the solution,
let me clarify the incentives of the provider and the resulting expectations of the users.
Call the accountability level announced by the provider σ′. The accountability level expected
by a user is denoted σ̃. If no certification procedure is in place, the choice of σ made by the
provider is unobservable to all other players. Because c(σ) is increasing in σ, it is rational for
the provider to set σ = 0 then. Users realize this incentive. Consequently, independent of σ′,
without credible certification we have σ̃ = 0 at equilibrium.
In turn, if a credible certification mechanism is in place (which is shown below) that hands
out a certificate to a provider if, and only if, the provider’s σ ≥ σ̂, excess accountability above
the threshold level is still unobservable and hence would not be rewarded by paying a higher
price by users. It follows that, if a provider wants to earn a certificate and expects the auditor
to make truthful decisions, her optimal response is to set σ = σ̂. Denote the fact that a provider
is certified by x = 1 and the fact that a provider is uncertified by x = 0. Then, if a credible




σ̂ if x = 1,
0 if x = 0.
(A.1)
Proof: At stage 6, if a user received a service with accountability level σ ≥ σ̂, a complaint
makes no sense because complaining is costly and ex post verification of the facts by the cloud
association is perfect. Thus, the expected payoff from complaining in this case would be −cC .
In contrast, if a user received a service with accountability level σ < σ̂, the user expects to be
reimbursed by the cloud association with a substitute service of accountability σ̂. Consequently,
the expected payoff from filing a complaint and receiving the substitute service is u−(1− σ̂)si−
cC . By contrast, without filing a complaint, the expected payoff remains u− (1− σ)si. It is in
the user’s interest to file a complaint if, and only if:
u− (1− σ̂)si − cC ≥ u− (1− σ)si (A.2)
⇔ cC ≤ (σ̂ − σ)si (A.3)
Because, by (A.1), the unique equilibrium accountability without certification is σ = 0, we find:
Lemma A.1 (Equilibrium user complaints) (i) If, and only if, the cost of complaining is
sufficiently small, cheated users will complain to the association (if cC ≤ σ̂si ≡ cC). (ii) Only
sufficiently security-sensitive users will complain (those for whom si ≥ cCσ̂ ).
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Because of Assumption 2, these constraints are fulfilled for approximately all users.44
At stage 5, every user can decide whether to buy from the monopolistic provider, or not.
Buying gives expected indirect utility of u− (1− σ̃)si − p. Because of (A.1), it follows that all
users with accountability preferences
si ≤ u− p1
1− σ̂ ≡ s1 (A.4)
buy cloud services if x = 1, whereas all users with preferences
si ≤ u− p0 ≡ s0 (A.5)
buy cloud services if x = 0, where p1 (p0) denotes the price charged by a certified (uncertified)
provider and s1 > s0. As the maximum of s1 is s̄, the market is fully covered if p1 ≤ u−(1−σ̂)s̄ ⇔
σ̂ ≥ 1− u−p1s̄ , or if p0 ≤ u− s̄.
At stage 4, the commissioned certification agency decides about auditing effort a and certi-
fication x. Because of the cloud association’s ability to use a grim trigger strategy, that is, to
exclude shirking certifiers from all business in the future, the certifier’s trade-off is as follows:
If it invests the auditing cost cA and truthfully awards the certificate, it expects a net payoff,
R− cA, now and in every subsequent period t in which it is commissioned by the cloud associ-
ation to conduct an audit. In this baseline model with 1 certifier, it expects an audit job every
future period. If the certifier does not invest in auditing, it can only make a guess about the
provider’s true σ. Recall that the solution concept used is subgame-perfect equilibrium in pure
strategies. This implies that, if the certifier would not spend cA but still award a certificate, the
provider’s best-response would be to set σ = 0. In this case, however, because of Lemma A.1,
the fraud would be detected and the certifier would never obtain an auditing job in the future
again.45 Consequently, the certifier will invest auditing effort and truthfully decide about x if,
and only if:
1
1− δ (R− cA) ≥ R (A.6)
⇔ R ≥ cA
δ
(A.7)
The left-hand side (LHS) of (A.6) is the certifier’s net present value if she invests effort into
auditing and truthfully awards the certificate; the right-hand side (RHS) is the net present value
from cheating once, saving cA, and never earning R in the future. Re-arranging yields (A.7).
At stage 3, the cloud association commissions the licensed certifier and determines the
revenue R it offers for conducting the audit.46 Because the association is run on behalf of
44See Section 4.5 for the adapted results and a simple solution if complaining is costly.
45If the certifier sets a = 0 and does not award a certificate, she risks that a provider with σ = σ̂ complains to
the association, which, after verification, implies a loss of all future auditing mandates for the certifier.
46See section 4.4 for the case where one certifier is randomly chosen from a pool of licensed certifiers.
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providers and users and not on behalf of certifiers, the nonprofit association’s board will minimize
R conditional on the commissioned certifier accepting the task and being incentivized to act
truthfully. Hence, we obtain the following Lemma.
Lemma A.2 (Equilibrium certifier revenues and auditing decisions) (i) The cloud as-
sociation offers a certifier revenue R∗ ≡ cAδ per audit. (ii) The certifier accepts the auditing job,
invests effort a = 1, and decides truthfully about the provider’s certification status.
At stage 2, the provider sets accountability level σ and price p, and decides whether to
spend F and seek certification by becoming an association member. Following (A.4) and (A.5),
the provider faces demand q1 = s1/s̄ if x = 1 and q0 = s0/s̄ if x = 0. Given (A.1), seeking
certification implies setting σ = σ̂ and not seeking certification implies σ = 0. Because we have
to distinguish among cases where the market is covered and where demand is elastic and cases





p u−p(1−σ̂)s̄ − c(σ̂)− F if σ = σ̂ and p > u− (1− σ̂)s̄,
p− c(σ̂)− F if σ = σ̂ and p ≤ u− (1− σ̂)s̄,
pu−ps̄ if σ = 0 and p > u− s̄,
p if σ = 0 and p ≤ u− s̄.
(A.8)





2 if σ = σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
u− (1− σ̂)s̄ if σ = σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ ,
u
2 if σ = 0 and
u
2 < s̄,
u− s̄ if σ = 0 and u2 ≥ s̄.
(A.9)
Assumption 1 rules out the fourth row of equation (A.9). Substituting (A.9) in (A.8) yields





4(1−σ̂)s̄ − c(σ)− F if σ = σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
u− (1− σ̂)s̄− c(σ)− F if σ = σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ ,
u2
4s̄ if σ = 0
(A.10)
47This result is qualitatively robust to introducing a constant marginal cost of production, k > 0, which
increases the equilibrium price if demand is flexible to P = u+k
2
. It adapts if the market structure changes. See
section 4.3 for the case of duopolistic providers.
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The provider prefers to seek certification and set accountability σ = σ̂ over not seeking
certification and setting σ = 0 if, and only if:
u2
4(1− σ̂)s̄ − c(σ)− F ≥
u2
4s̄
if σ = σ̂ < 1− u
2s̄
, (A.11)
u− (1− σ̂)s̄− c(σ)− F ≥ u
2
4s̄
if σ = σ̂ ≥ 1− u
2s̄
. (A.12)
Rearranging (A.11) and (A.12), certification is attractive for the provider if, and only if:
σ̂ ≥ 1− u
2
4s̄(c(σ) + F ) + u2
if σ = σ̂ < 1− u
2s̄
, (A.13)






if σ = σ̂ ≥ 1− u
2s̄
. (A.14)
Equation (A.13) determines a non-empty set if 1 − u2
4s̄(c(σ)+F )+u2
< 1 − u2s̄ . Hence, seeking
certification can be made attractive for the provider, via determining σ̂, if and only if:






for σ̂ < 1− u
2s̄
, (A.15)
In turn, both conditions in equation (A.14) describe lower bounds on σ̂. The binding (higher)




1− u2s̄ if u ∈ (0, 12(s̄−
√
5s̄2 − 8s̄(c(σ) + F )))
2(s̄−u)2
4s̄2
+ c(σ)+Fs̄ if u ∈ [12(s̄−
√
5s̄2 − 8s̄(c(σ) + F ), 2s̄))




Lemma A.3 (Provider incentives and pricing) The provider prices cloud services as in
(A.9). She sets σ = σ̂, joins the association for the fee F , and seeks certification if the respective
conditions in (A.15) and (A.16) hold.
At stage 1, the cloud association’s board determines σ̂ and F and licenses a certifier, for
cost cL. As F is the association’s only source of income, it must be able to cover all its
expenses related to the licensing of one certifier and the certification of one provider, namely
R∗, cL, and cV .48 Using Lemma A.2, the lower bound on F (the minimum membership-fee) is
F = cAδ + cL+ cV . Neither the representatives of providers nor those of users on the association
board have an interest in charging excessive fees, which would only make association membership
less attractive but serve no positive purpose. Hence F equals the equilibrium fee.
Regarding σ̂, the preferences of the board representatives of providers and users are different,
however. Increasing σ̂ beyond (1 − u2s̄) decreases the provider’s profits because revenues stay
constant but accountability costs increase. It follows that the representatives of providers solve
48To demonstrate the main mechanism clearly, I abstract away both from factors that could influence F in
case of multiple certifiers or providers, such as economies of scale in licensing or the fact that on the equilibrium







4(1−σ̂)s̄ − c(σ̂)− F if σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
u− (1− σ̂)s̄− c(σ)− F if σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ .
(A.17)
s.t. (A.15) and (A.16) hold and π(x = 1) ≥ 0.
The side-constraints make sure that (i) seeking certification is incentive compatible for the
provider and (ii) that the provider’s participation constraint (to produce without making losses)
holds. Because the provider makes positive profits without certification—see (A.10)—if the
incentive compatibility constraints, (A.15) and (A.16), hold, the participation constraint also
holds (and hence does not have to be considered explicitly any further).
To find the most-preferred (=profit-maximizing) level of σ̂ for the provider we solve (A.17)








if σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
σ|c′(σ) = s̄ if σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ .
(A.18)
where c′(σ) denotes the provider’s marginal cost of accountability. The first row of (A.18) implies
c′(σ) < s̄, the second row implies c′(σ) = s̄. It follows that, depending on the shape of c(σ),
provider representatives prefer to set σ̂ = {σ|c′(σ) < s̄} until the threshold level σ̂ = 1 − u2s̄ is
reached. Then σ̂ = {σ|c′(σ) = s̄} is profit-maximizing. Which of the two σ̂-levels solves (A.17)
depends on the shape of c(σ). This completely characterizes the solution to the providers’
representatives’ optimization problem.






0 (u− (1− σ̂)si − p1)dsi if x = 1,
∫ q0
0 (u− si − p0)dsi if x = 0.
(A.19)
Substituting q1 = s1/s̄, q0 = s0/s̄, and p





8s̄2(1−σ̂) if σ = σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ ,
1
2(2s̄− 1)(1− σ̂) if σ = σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ ,
(2s̄−1)u2
8s̄2
if σ = 0.
(A.20)





, if σ̂ < 1− u2s̄ , (A.21)
1
2
(2s̄− 1)(1− σ̂) > (2s̄− 1)u
2
8s̄2
, if σ̂ ≥ 1− u2s̄ (A.22)
Inequality (A.21) holds for all σ̂ > 0. The difference between the LHS and RHS of (A.21)
is growing in σ̂. Hence, in this case the user representatives prefer the highest supported level
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range, consumer surplus from certification is monotonically decreasing in σ̂. Hence, the user
representatives prefer the lowest supported level of σ̂, 1− u2s̄ . Here is a summary of the stage 1
results.
Lemma A.4 (Equilibrium membership-fee and accountability preferences) (i) The equi-
librium membership-fee is F ∗ = cAδ +cL+cV . (ii) The board representatives of users would prefer
an accountability level of σ̂∗U = 1 − u2s̄ but will not veto any σ̂ ≤ 1 − u
2
4s̄2
. (iii) The provider’s






4(1−σ̂1)s̄ − c(σ̂1) > u− (1− σ̂2)s̄− c(σ̂2),
σ̂2 otherwise
(A.23)




|σ < 1− u2s̄} and σ̂2 ≡ {σ|c′(σ) = s̄∧σ ≥ 1− u2s̄}. (iv) The equilibrium
threshold accountability level of the cloud association is σ̂∗ = σ̂∗P s.t. σ̂
∗ ≤ 1− u2
4s̄2
.
Substituting σ̂∗ and p∗ in (A.4) we derive users’ equilibrium consumption decisions (at stage
5) and the associated payoffs.
Lemma A.5 (Equilibrium consumption and payoffs) (i) In the certification equilibrium,
all users with accountability preferences si ≤ s1∗ buy the provider’s service for the price p∗,
where s1
∗ = u2(1−σ̂∗) if c








2(2s̄− 1)(1− σ̂∗) if c′(σ̂∗) ≥ s̄.
(A.24)





4(1−σ̂∗)s̄ − c(σ̂∗)− ( cAδ + cL + cV ) if c′(σ̂∗) < s̄,
u− (1− σ̂∗)s̄− c(σ̂∗)− ( cAδ + cL + cV ) if c′(σ̂∗) ≥ s̄.
(A.25)





8s̄2(1−σ̂∗) − c(σ̂∗)− ( cAδ + cL + cV ) if c′(σ̂∗) < s̄,
u− (1−σ̂∗)2 − c(σ̂∗)− ( cAδ + cL + cV ) if c′(σ̂∗) ≥ s̄.
(A.26)
Total welfare is equal where both cases merge, at σ̂ = 1 − u2s̄ , namely there W ∗ = u − u4s̄ −
c(σ̂∗)− ( cAδ + cL + cV ). This concludes the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Illustrative example: For illustration, consider the following numerical example. Assume
u = s̄ = 1, which satisfies Assumption 1. Assume cAδ + cV + cL = 0.1 = F , and c(σ) = σ
2,
which satisfies (3). Thus, we know that demand is elastic for all σ̂ < 1 − u2s̄ = 12 . In this case,
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certification is only attractive for the provider if (A.15) holds, which requires: σ̂+0.1 < 12+
12
4∗1 ⇔
σ̂ < 0.65. (A.18) then implies that the profit-maximizing σ̂ = 1 − 1
2
√
1∗2σ̂ ⇒ σ̂∗elastic = 0.19.
Substituting values in (A.17) shows that π∗elastic = 0.17. By contrast, demand is fixed at q = 1 for
σ̂ ≥ 12 . (A.18) states that the provider’s profit is maximized at σ̂|c′(σ̂) = s̄ ⇔ 2σ̂ = 1 ⇒ σ̂∗fixed =
0.5. Substituting values in (A.17) shows that even with this profit-maximizing choice of σ̂ and
before constraining the choice further by applying (A.16), π∗fixed = 1−(1− 12)∗1−2∗0.5−0.1 =
−0.6. Finally, because π∗elastic > max{π∗fixed, 0}, σ̂∗P = σ̂∗elastic maximizes the provider’s profits.
Consumers, on the other hand, prefer σ̂∗U = 1 − u2s̄ = 0.5, which would generate CS =
1
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